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ABSTRACT
Several years after the inception of the most dominant cryptocurrency, bitcoin,
the European Central Bank in 2015 indicated the need for establishing legal
clarity by relevant authorities through explaining how the current legal
framework applies to cryptocurrencies. Three years later, no meaningful step
has been taken by any of the European Union (EU) institutions including the
parliament. By examining the EU’s legal framework governing payments
services, including the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) Regulation, the
Electronic Money Directive, the Payment Services Directive and the proposed
AML/CTF Directive, this article concludes that (a) because the existing
payment services laws apply to payments effected in currencies (legal tenders)
and cryptocurrencies are not defined as currencies under the EU law or the laws
of member states, they do not cover cryptocurrencies. It also argues that it is
impossible to design sui generis payments services law for cryptocurrencies
without curbing their essential features, especially decentralization. Lastly, the
article proposes centralization and the creation of state cryptocurrency as
possible solutions moving forward and examines their strengths and challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, it was acceptable to define a cryptocurrency as digital
peer-to-peer currency created by cryptography1. But such a definition is no
longer universally valid because despite the fact that the term currency appears
in cryptocurrency, there is a strong argument that a cryptocurrency is not a
currency2 and today there are new kinds of tokens that indeed qualify clearly as
security3, hence negating the notion that cryptocurrencies are peer-to–peer
currencies, or at least casting doubt on it.
A further explanation of cryptocurrencies is likely to state that unlike
traditional currencies issued by the central banks, a cryptocurrency has no
central authority that controls its creation and circulation.4 Yet, the New
Generation Cryptocurrencies (NGCs) created by initial coin offering provide
counter-examples to the narrative of lack of central authority running a
cryptocurrency5. Some of the NGCs are fairly centralized and there is an entity
which has the upper hand in their creation and distribution6. Consequently, if
there is one lesson to be learnt from the evolution of cryptocurrencies, it is that
there is nothing constant in the definition of a cryptocurrency. The only constant
is the fast evolution of cryptocurrencies and businesses centred on them and the
lack of robust legal framework regulating them in many areas.
This article singles out the European Union’s payment services law to
analyse whether tailor-made payment services law for cryptocurrencies could
be designed. A task of paramount importance for this article is exposing the
1

See generally Timothy Bierer, Hashing Out: The Problems and Solutions Concerning
Cryptocurrency used as Article 9 Collateral, 7 J. OF L., TECH., AND THE INTERNET 79 (2016)
81; Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology, and the
Rise of Lex Cryptographia, (March 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
2
Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE WESTERN L.
REV. 609 (2015), 626.
3
See Arjya Majumdar, A Regulatory Outlook on Initial Coin Offerings, OXFORD BUS. L.
BLOG (Aug 3, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-lawblog/blog/2017/08/regulatory-outlook-initial-coin-offerings. Hacker & Thomale
make distinctions between three types of token archetypes, namely, currency, utility and
investment token and argue that only investment tokens qualify as securities. See also Hacker,
Philipp and Thomale, Chris, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and
Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law (November 22, 2017), p. 43. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075820.
4
See Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal Bits”: Examining the Legal
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 588 (2014) at 590;
R. Ali, J. Barrdear, R. Clews, and J. Southgate, Innovations in payment technologies and the
emergence of digital currencies, 54 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULLETIN 262.
5
Supra note 3.
6
Id.
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ideological nature of the debate on the regulation of cryptocurrencies, as a result
of which many exaggerated claims regarding cryptocurrencies have escaped
unquestioned in literature dealing with law and technology. The result of this
uncritical reception of whatever industry experts claim about cryptocurrencies
and pretending that nothing happened when those claims turned out to be false
or exaggerated is lack of credibility in intellectual debates and of regulatory
efforts.
One of the narratives that have been advanced is that cryptocurrencies
would help bank the unbanked.7 This claim has been one of the buzz words that
have been spreading around, but when the value of the major cryptocurrencies
became unaffordable, not just to the unbanked but to the middle-income earner8
and transactions in cryptocurrencies are exceedingly technical and risky, it is
clear that cryptocurrencies have nothing to do with the unbanked. Just to be
clear, the so-called unbanked are those who have no access to financial services
such as credit card or debit card9. The claim that cryptocurrencies would give
the unbanked access to financial services was clearly bogus from the very outset
and proven to be false now. But the claim is now buried under more junk news
reports on the internet and nobody is willing to go to the archives and pull them
out to ask the industry experts what they were thinking when they made the
claim. Highlighting on the campaign strategy of early bitcoin developers,
Former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis stated:
There is a Bitcoin aristocracy, the Bitcoin early adopters, who
accumulated very cheaply Bitcoins from the beginning. They
have every reason to talk this thing up and lure people into like
a Tulip-like mania or a pyramid, making extravagant claims
[…] to (open and use a new Bitcoin ATM). This was all just
hype.10

7

Paul Vigna and Michael J. Casey, Bitcoin for the Unbanked: Cryptocurrencies That Go
Where Big Banks Won’t, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/bitcoin-unbanked; Steve Forbes, How Bitcoin Will
End World Poverty Forbes Magazine, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2015/04/02/how-bitcoin-will-end-worldpoverty/#40cb2eb82a5a; George Basiladze, How Cryptocurrencies Can Help Bank the
Unbanked, FIN. MAGNETS (Aug. 16, 2015),
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/bloggers/how-cryptocurrencies-can-helpbank-the-unbanked/
8
It suffices to state that as of January 12, 2018 on Bitsmap (exchange), the rate for bitcoin is
over 13,000 USD, for Bitcoin Cash is over 2,500 USD, for Ethereum is over 1,000 USD and
for Ripple is over 2,000 USD. Whether or not this rates fluctuate, increase, or reduce drastically,
they have already demonstrated that cryptocurrencies have nothing to do with the unbanked.
9
Eric Sammons, How Cryptocurrencies like Dash Help the Poor, DASH NEWS (Aug 23, 2017),
https://www.dashforcenews.com/cryptocurrencies-like-dash-help-poor/.
10
Evan Smart, Bitcoin Debate between Andreas Antonopoulos vs. The Greek Finance Minister,
CRYTOCOIN NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/bitcoin-debate-andreasantonopoulos-vs-greek-finance-minister/.
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These are important issues as they demonstrate that the appropriate
regulatory policy response for cryptocurrencies must begin with the assumption
that the cryptocurrency economy is built on a bubble and the early developers
of cryptocurrencies cannot be trusted to offer responsible policy framework for
self-regulation.
1.

OVERVIEW OF THE CRYPTOCURRENCY SYSTEM
1.1 DEFINING CRYPTOCURRENCIES

“Cryptocurrency is a system of currency that uses cryptography to allow
secure transfer and exchange of digital tokens in a distributed and decentralised
manner.”11 The most dominant cryptocurrency that laid the ground for all
cryptocurrencies is bitcoin, which was created by a person or a group identified
pseudonymously as Satoshi Nakamoto12. The white paper of bitcoin defines
bitcoin as “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash that allows online
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a
financial institution.”13 The idea of enabling fund transfer to be conducted
without an intermediary is one of the reasons for the creation of bitcoin and
subsequent other cryptocurrencies. Similarly, to other cryptocurrencies, bitcoin
can only be stored on a computer (or a smart phone)14.
Cryptocurrencies are created by mining -- solving automatically
generated mathematical puzzles towards processing transactions of users15. In
technical terms, “…mining is the competitive process of collecting transactions
and adding them to the blockchain in the form of blocks.’16 “Blockchain is a
sequence of blocks, which holds the complete record of transactions (a public
ledger) indicating the order in which the transactions occurred.”17
The total number of bitcoins to be created is limited by the bitcoin
protocol to 21 Million BTC18, an upper limit that is either different or not
applicable to most of the other active cryptocurrencies. To encourage miners in
maintaining the system by taking part in the mining process, 50 bitcoins were
rewarded initially to a miner that solves the mathematical puzzle, an amount
that reduces by half quadrennially19. As the mathematical puzzles become more
11

Eli Dourado and Jerry Brito, Cryptocurrency, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON.
(2014).
12
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG (Nov. 1,
2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
13
Id
14
Conrad Barski and Chris Wilmer, Bitcoin for the Befuddled, NO SCRATCH PRESS (2015) 1.
15
Id at 4.
16
Id at 6.
17
David Lee Kuo Chuen, Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, financial
Instruments, and Big Data, ELSEVIER INC. (2015) at 49.
18
Andreas M. Antonopoulos, MASTERING BITCOIN 2 (Mike Loudikes and Allyson MacDonald,
1st Ed. 2015).
19
Id.
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difficult and the reward smaller, miners invest more time and resource today in
mining20. Once all the 21 million bitcoins are created, the exclusive source of
miners’ income would be transaction fees21. As of September 2017, there are a
little over 16-million bitcoins in circulation22.
1.2 WHY CRYPTOCURRENCIES?
Understanding the reasons for the birth of cryptocurrencies gives a
complete picture of the regulatory problem embodied in them. It also allows
one to appreciate whether there was a realistic vision for the creation of a system
of payment or currency. Since the creation of bitcoin coincided with the 2008
global financial crisis, it is commonly suggested that bitcoin is the result of the
global financial crisis, although there is no concrete evidence for that23. The
purpose and the core principles of cryptocurrencies do not address the causes
or consequences of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored
that the lack of trust in government institutions and central banks that ensued
during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis might have been
exploited as a marketing tool by the developers and backers of bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies24. But that remains the only connection between
cryptocurrencies and the global financial crisis.
A strong argument is made that cryptocurrencies have four potential
advantages relative to cash money and traditional payment services that justify
their creation, i.e., they are cheap payment methods, trustless, decentralized,
and pseudonymous25. But most of these attributes are more talking points than
true attributes that withstand even the slightest scrutiny, as examined in the
preceding sub-sections. Though these features of decentralized
cryptocurrencies are frequently discussed in literature, it is necessary to provide
their overview since they are important in examining the feasibility of
constructing payment services law for cryptocurrencies.
1.2.1 CHEAP
Cryptocurrencies are claimed to lower transaction costs because
transactions such as transfer of funds do not involve third party intermediaries

20

Id.
Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 213, 218.
22
Bitcoins
in
circulation,
BLOCKCHAIN
INFO
(Sep.
22,
2017),
https://blockchain.info/charts/total-bitcoins.
23
See Yanis Varoufakis, Bitcoin and the dangerous fantasy of ‘apolitical’ money, YANIS
VAROUFAKIS BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/04/22/bitcoin-andthe-dangerous-fantasy-of-apolitical-money/.
24
Id.
25
Supra footnote 17 at 436.
21
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that charge fees26. Discussing the advantage of bitcoin over cash money, Bill
Gates stated that bitcoin is exciting because it shows how cheap transfer of fund
from one place to another can be27. Every bitcoin transaction is verified and
approved by the majority of the miners on the blockchain28. The transaction
verification entitles the miner to a certain number of bitcoins -- 50 during the
earlier days29. Due to the limited number of reward bitcoins that can be obtained
as more bitcoins are created and the increased difficulty in solving the
mathematical puzzle, the reward system is considered to be insufficient to
incentivize miners. Today, miners earn bitcoins by charging transaction fees30.
From 2015 to 2017, transactions fees in bitcoin have increased up to 1200 %31.
Hence, the argument that bitcoin is cheap is not valid anymore.
With regard to other cryptocurrencies as well, the transaction fee is not
that cheap32. It must be noted that there is difficulty in ascertaining how much
one pays for each transaction due to the fact that the majority of the
cryptocurrencies are expensive and used only by business entities or individuals
with high income, which actually makes the cryptocurrency system inaccessible
to people with low income or even independent researchers with insufficient
fund to conduct experimental transactions. Transaction fees cannot be assessed
without conducting transactions. Hence, it should not come as a surprise if
evidence regarding transaction fees that come from news sources may be
dismissed as unreliable. But some cryptocurrency exchanges today display their
transaction fee schedule to users on their webpages. For instance as of February
1, 2018, “Transferring funds from Bitstamp account to a credit card carries a
flat fee of $10 for amounts up to $1000 and 2% for transfers above $1000.”33
This means that to transfer 3000 dollar equivalent of Ether or any other
Bitstamp traded cryptocurrency to his/her bank account, the user pays 60
dollars. This is not a cheap transaction fee at all. Comparatively, Coinbase
discloses the fee at the time the user conducts the transaction.34.
26

Edward V. Murphy, CONG. RESEARCH REP, Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues
5 (2015).
27
Charlotte Krol, Bill Gates: Bitcoin is exciting because it is cheap, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3,
2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/11138905/Bill-Gates-Bitcoin-is-excitingbecause-it-is-cheap.html.
28
Supra note 17 at 38.
29
Supra note 12 at 217.
30
Does Coinbase Pay Miner or Network Fees when Sending Digital Currency?, COINBASE
(August 4 2017), https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/815435-does-coinbasepay-bitcoin-miner-fees.
31
Justin Connell, Bitcoin Transaction Fees Are Up More Than 1200% in Past Two Years,
BITCOIN.COM (Feb. 22 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-transaction-fees-1200-pasttwo-years/
32
See Alyssa Hertig, Bought your first Bitcoin or Ether? Brace for the Fees, COINDESK (Dec,
18, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/bought-first-bitcoin-ether-now-brace-fees/.
33
Unified Fee Schedule, BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/fee_schedule/.
34
Coinbase Pricing & Fees Disclosures, COINBASE (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2109597-coinbase-pricingfees-disclosures.
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1.2.2 TRUSTLESS
In traditional banking (payment services), customers should trust
intermediaries including the bank and other third party payment service
providers35, while in decentralized cryptocurrency systems, on a basic level,
trust in an intermediary is unnecessary36. Cryptocurrencies are considered to
remove the requirement of trusting intermediaries to process transactions.37
Antonopoulos states:
Here’s the most important effect of this new trust model of trustby-computation: no one actor is trusted, and no one needs to be
trusted. There is no central authority or trusted third party in a
distributed consensus network38.
The argument that blockchain removes trusted third parties assumes that
the blockchain is the only infrastructure necessary for the functioning of
cryptocurrencies. But that simply is naïve and perhaps a denial of the reality of
cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies cannot function without other supporting
infrastructures such as exchanges and digital wallets. First time users of
cryptocurrencies must necessarily purchase cryptocurrencies from exchanges
using traditional currencies and this renders the exchange a necessary part of
the cryptocurrency ecosystem, unless the user in question is a miner who earns
cryptocurrencies by mining; in the latter case, the user has the option to transact
directly from the blockchain. Then users may need to store their
cryptocurrencies in third-party administered digital wallets who should keep
funds safely but may also use their power to the detriment of users.
Cryptocurrency exchanges and wallet providers are similar to traditional
financial institutions. They are third-party intermediaries that operate on the
same principle of trust. They are susceptible to the same problems traditional
financial institutions are, including charging excessive fees, using personal
information for unconsented purposes, insolvency and many other events.
Moreover, exchange and digital wallets are vulnerable to hacking39 and other
attacks that enormously affect users. In order to advance that cryptocurrencies
do not require trust, a strong case has to be made that cryptocurrency exchanges
35

Supra note 12 at 1.
Brian Kelly, THE BITCOIN BIG BANG: HOW ALTERNATIVE CURRENCIES ARE ABOUT TO
CHANGE THE WORLD 69 (2015).
37
Carl P. Mullan, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLENGE: SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
THROUGH US FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 88 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
38
Andrea Antonopoulos, Bitcoin security model: trust by computation A shift from trusting
people to trusting math, RADAR (Feb. 20, 2014), http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/02/bitcoinsecurity-model-trust-by-computation.html.
39
See generally Mt. Gox Collapse of 214 resulting in loss of 850000.000 BTC due to hacking,
BITCOIN TALK (Nov. 16, 2014), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=57633; See Wolfie
Zhao, $30 Million: Ether Reported Stolen Due to Parity Wallet Breach, COINDESK (July 19,
2017), https://www.coindesk.com/30-million-ether-reported-stolen-parity-wallet-breach/.
36
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and digital wallet service providers are not necessary part of the cryptocurrency
ecosystem.
Last but not the least, one of the areas in which a trust by users is
required is transaction confirmation. Because the cost for verification of
transactions is covered mostly by transactions fees and different users can offer
different fees, certain transactions could remain unconfirmed in the blockchain
because miners could choose to dedicate their computational skill to higher fee
transactions and that happens today more often40. The users who offer relatively
lower transaction fee do not have the assurance that their transactions get
confirmed in time. This requires a trust in the miners. Noted earlier,
cryptocurrency exchange based fees are fixed by the exchanges and are not
negotiable between the user and the miners, representing an exception to the
negotiability of fee and its potential effect in delaying transactions. In the face
of the above facts, it seems that trustlessness is merely marketing tool advanced
by the developers and early backers of cryptocurrencies.
1.2.3 DECENTRALIZED
Another attribute of cryptocurrencies is decentralization. It is argued
that “the lack of central points of oversight, planning, and control makes
cryptocurrencies less susceptible to catastrophic failure.’41 The blockchain is
available to anyone who is able to engage in mining by dedicating their
computational skill42. Decentralization is expressed not only in the lack of
central point of control but also in the broadcasting of all transactions conducted
using the cryptocurrency in question to the nodes (computers in the network)43.
This in turn ensures transparency and prevents central point of failure as there
is no single entity that controls the infrastructure, or can manipulate or tempt
with the system44.
The claim of decentralization should be addressed differently for two
category of cryptocurrencies, i.e., for the earlier generation cryptocurrencies
such as bitcoin and ether and for the new generation cryptocurrencies. While
for the former, in theory decentralization is possible, for the latter, it is almost
non-existent by definition as shown later.

40

Erik Vohress, The True Cost of Bitcoin Transactions, MONEY AND STATE (Sep. 22, 2017),
http://moneyandstate.com/the-true-cost-of-bitcoin-transactions/.
41
John Blocke, Decentralization Fetishism is Hindering Bitcoin’s Progress, MEDIUM,
https://medium.com/@johnblocke/decentralization-fetishism-is-hindering-bitcoins-progress11cfa5c7964d.
42
Supra note 18 at 177.
43
Pierluigi Cuccuru, Beyond bitcoin: an early overview on smart contracts 25 Int’l. J. of L. and
Info. Tech. 1, 4.
44
Id at 4-5.
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For earlier generation cryptocurrencies, the blockchain is available to anyone
who is willing and able to engage in mining45, which makes the system open
and decentralized in principle. Nevertheless, questioning the claim of
decentralization in bitcoin, De Filippi and Loveluck argue:
…Hence, just like many other open source projects, there is a
discrepancy between those who can provide input to the project
(the community at large) and those who have the ultimate call
as to where the project is going. Indeed, while anyone is entitled
to submit changes to the software (such as bug fixes,
incremental improvements, etc.), only a small number of
individuals (the core developers) have the power to decide
which changes shall be incorporated into the main branch of the
software.46
Hence, in the governance structure of bitcoin, decentralization shrinks
at the top level with implication not only for the democratic decision-making
process but also on the technical functioning of the system47. The following is
an example of how the decision-making process weakens the system. In the
design of the blockchain for bitcoin, every block has a capacity of 1 megabyte48.
The block size limit was placed disputably to ensure that the blockchain remains
decentralized, since high block size means that there would be delays in
transaction propagation as large miners can benefit at the expense of small
miners, hence creating centralization49.
Some of the core developers of bitcoin wanted to increase the block size
on the ground that it has been arbitrarily fixed and was causing delay in
transaction confirmation50. Some claimed that transactions remain unexecuted
between 60 seconds to 14 hours as a direct consequence of the limit in block
size51. Due to disagreement among the core developers on whether to increase
the block size, Mike Hearn, one of the core developers resigned as a full-time
bitcoin developer in January 201652.
45

Supra note 18, at 177.
Primavera De Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The invisible politics of Bitcoin: governance
crisis of a Decentralised infrastructure, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 13 (2016).
47
Id.
48
Average Block Size, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size; See also,
supra note 44, at 7.
49
Arguments
against
increasing
the
block
size?,
REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/5p9iv8/arguments_against_increasing_the_block
_size/.
50
Jeff Garzik, Bitcoin is Being Hot-Wired for Settlement, MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://medium.com/@jgarzik/bitcoin-is-being-hot-wired-for-settlement-a5beb1df223a.
51
Steve Sokolowski, Why Payouts Didn't Execute Today, PROHASHING (Dec. 11, 2015),
https://forums.prohashing.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=679.
52
Joseph Young, Mike Hearn Resigns and Leaves Bitcoin Permanently, NEWSBTC (Jan. 15,
2016),
http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/15/mike-hearn-resigns-and-leaves-bitcoinpermanently/.
46
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Due to the sustained disagreement among the developers and miners, as
of August 1, 2017, a split or what is referred to in technical term as “a hard
fork” has occurred, leading to two different chains in the blockchain53. With the
hard fork, two separate systems have been created, i.e., one that requires
upgrading the software to Segwitx2 increasing the block size from 1 megabyte
to 2 and stores some of the bitcoins off the blockchain, and the other which
merely increases the block size to 8 megabytes54. The latter option, i.e., where
the block size is increased to 8 megabytes, led to the creation of a new
cryptocurrency – bitcoin cash (BCC)55. “Tuesday evening (1st of August 2017),
several hours after the fork had been completed, Coin Market Cap reported that
Bitcoin Cash (BCH) which is the newly created by using the 8 megabytes block
is priced around $379.40, a fraction of the original Bitcoin’s value, which is
priced at $2720.”56 Users who have stored their bitcoins on hard drive have the
option to continue to use bitcoin, or the new currency bitcoin cash57. Today,
both bitcoin and bitcoin cash are operating separately.
These stories suggest that bitcoin is not as decentralized as it is claimed
to be. Whatever core changes take place to the bitcoin protocol depends on
whether the core developers agree on it58. The core developers are not
democratically elected group of people. They were chosen based on their
expertise, their involvement in the project and their shared ideology with the
founder59. The small miners down the ladder are insignificant as far as major
changes are concerned unless they take matters into their hands and create a
parallel system of currency, which actually weakens the system.
With respect to the NGCs, decentralization is officially compromised.
The NGCs are based on the concept that only those who directly invest money
in project have access to the infrastructure. Mining is controlled and monitored
by a central authority, usually the team of developers that create the blockchain
concerned and offer the tokens to the public for sale through Initial Coin
Offering (ICO). To illustrate, Evion white paper states that there are only two
channels of mining operation60. The first one is where Evion, the company
mines the tokens while the second is where a third-party that has a contract with
Evion mines the tokens with the view to sharing profit61. Mining ENV token is
not open to the public, leading to the conclusion that there is now a new type of
53

Brooke Wanser, Bitcoin Cash: Five Facts You Need to Know, HEAVY (Aug. 3, 2017),
http://heavy.com/news/2017/08/how-does-bitcoin-cash-work/.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
James Titcomb, Bitcoin Cash: Price of New Currency Rises after Bitcoin's Hard Fork, THE
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/01/bitcoin-casheverything-need-know-bitcoins-hard-fork/.
58
See Team, BITCOIN CORE (2017), https://bitcoincore.org/en/team/.
59
See supra note 46 at 13.
60
Envion Mobile, Mining White Paper,
https://www.envion.org/en/download/envion_whitepaper.pdf
61
Id.
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cryptocurrency that defies one of the major features of earlier cryptocurrencies
by introducing centralization.
1.2.4 PSEUDONYMOUS
The last feature of cryptocurrencies that makes them attractive is
pseudonymity62. In bitcoin, although all transactions conducted by the user are
publicly visible, they are represented by the public key (bitcoin address for
instance), which is a unique set of numbers and letters serving as pseudonym63.
The pseudonymity provided by blockchain can be de-anonymized using
techniques that link the public key to the identity of the user64, for instance when
a user purchases a cryptocurrency from an exchange using bank account. More
complex techniques can also be applied to tackle pseudonymity65. But deanonymization takes time, requires technological expertise and money which
makes it difficult.
In the era of mass collection and misuse of personal data by
governments
and
giant
corporations,
the
need
to
ensure
anonymity/pseudonymity in many cases might be necessary66. But it is also the
tool that enables illegality that must be carefully addressed. Viewed from
practical point of view, it is the reason cryptocurrencies are preferred by certain
users. But even this feature is useful only if the user is a miner. For those who
rely on exchanges and third party digital wallets, there is an identity verification
process whereby the user must submit identity documents67.

2.

OVERVIEW OF THE
CRYPTOCURRENCIES

LEGAL

CLASSIFICATION

OF

2.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGAL CLASSIFICATION
The clarity in the legal classification of cryptocurrencies is crucial in
defining regulatory policies, ensuring legal certainty and rule of law. In 2016, a
Florida State Circuit judge dismissed a money laundering charge on the ground
that bitcoin did not qualify as a monetary instrument, a perquisite for money
62

Hanna Halaburda and Miklos Sarvary, BEYOND BITCOIN: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
CURRENCIES 100 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); supra note 4, at 593.
63
Pedro Franco, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOCURRENCY, ENGINEERING AND
ECONOMICS 209 (Wiley, 2015).
64
Id.
65
Supra note 63, at 13.
66
See Leon Hempel and Hans Lammerant, Impact Assessments as Negotiated Knowledge,
REFORMING EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW (2015) 141.
67
See Privacy Policy, BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/privacy-policy/.
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laundering offence under the Florida State Anti-Money Laundering Law68. No
similar case has been handled in the European Union so far, but the Florida
Court decision clearly demonstrates why legal classification is consequential.
The significance of determining the legal category of cryptocurrencies
transcends anti-money laundering law. Today, there are licensed
cryptocurrency exchange platforms that perform exchange of traditional
currencies to cryptocurrencies and vice-versa69. A new type of intermediary cryptocurrency custodial wallet providers that offer custodial services to users,
like banks provide bank account (deposit service) to customers, has emerged70.
The rights and duties of these intermediaries towards their customers and
regulators depend on how cryptocurrencies are classified. Determining whether
cryptocurrencies should be taxed, how they should be taxed, and many more
policy decisions vary depending on how cryptocurrencies are classified.
The lack of clear legal category for cryptocurrencies could lead to
differential treatment of different financial institutions and their respective
customers as well as other business entities. Hence, while a payment service
provider transferring 50 dollars on behalf of its customer is subjected the KnowYour-Customer requirement of anti-money laundering law that imposes
burdensome obligations on the financial institution as well as the customer71, an
intermediary and its customer using cryptocurrency could transfer thousands of
dollars without being bound by similar requirements. A company investing in
agriculture or green energy is subjected to the regulatory requirements of
securities law while cryptocurrency centered companies are uncovered by
securities law in Europe. This kind of differential application of legal rules to
essentially similar institutions and persons exists in the areas of taxation,
prudential regulation of financial institutions and other regulatory regimes to
which financial institutions, companies and individual persons are subjected. It
is for this reason that the debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies
is crucial to many stakeholders and is highly divisive.
68

§ Fl. St. Ord. 896.101(2)(d)-(e)
List of Digital Currency Exchanges from Around the World, STEEMIT (June 2017),
https://steemit.com/bitcoin/@xikandarxaheer/list-of-digital-currency-exchanges-from-aroundthe-world.
70
“A custodian wallet provider is an entity that provides services to safeguard private
cryptographic keys on behalf of their customers, to holding, store and transfer virtual
currencies.” PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
AMENDING DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849 ON THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL
69

SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSES OF MONEY LAUNDERING OR TERRORIST FINANCING AND AMENDING
DIRECTIVE 2009/101/EC, COM (2016) 450, Proposed Addition of Paragraph 18(b) to Art. 3 of
DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 20 MAY
2015 ON THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSES OF MONEY
LAUNDERING OR TERRORIST FINANCING, AMENDING REGULATION (EU) NO 648/2012 OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, AND REPEALING DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AND COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/70/EC,

OJEU, L 141/73.
71
Doug Hopton, MONEY LAUNDERING: A CONCISE GUIDE FOR ALL BUSINESSES 78 (Gower Pub.
Ltd. 2009).
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2.2 RECAP OF THE DEBATE ON LEGAL CLASSIFICATION
Since cryptocurrencies are also used for exchange of goods and services
online as unit of account and store value fulfilling all the characteristics of the
economic definition of money,73 some argue that cryptocurrencies should be
treated as money74. Others argue that cryptocurrencies should be defined as
commodity75, an argument which is corroborated by the decision US
Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC)76 and the Internal Revenue
Service Guideline on Taxation of Cryptocurrencies77. In Europe, the Central
Bank of Finland has also classified cryptocurrencies are commodity78. The
central point of contention in this regard is the lack of inherent value of
cryptocurrencies79, while there scholars who argue that cryptocurrencies do
have inherent value in that they enable less costly two-party transactions than
traditional three-party transactions80.
In the US, the Federal Commodities Futures Trading Act defines
commodities broadly to include all interests, services and rights as long as
futures are traded on them that the CFTC used in its move to treat bitcoin as
commodity81. Peculiarly, the EU level definition of commodity attributes
tangibility to commodities thereby removing cryptocurrencies out-rightly from
the definition of commodity82. However, member states in the EU are free to
adopt their own definition of commodities83, which is why the Finnish Central
72

72

See 100+ Companies That Accept Bitcoins as Payment, EBAY (Dec. 11, 2015).
http://www.ebay.com/gds/100-Companies-That-Accept-Bitcoins-As-Payment/10000000206483242/g.html.
73
See Fredrick S. Mishkin, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44
(Pearson Education, 4th Edition, 2004).
74
Eric P. Pacy, Tales from the Cryptocurrency: On Bitcoin, Square Pegs, and Round Holes, 49
NEW ENG. L. REV. 121 (2014).
75
Supra note 2.
76
See U.S. v Coinflip, Inc., CFTC, Docket No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015).
77
IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency Is Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax
Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions Apply, IRS, IR-2014-36 (March 25, 2014).
78
Cameron Fuller, Bitcoin Vs. Bank of Finland: Cryptocurrencies Ruled as Commodities after
Failing Money Test, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014).
http://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-vs-bank-finland-cryptocurrencies-ruled-commodities-afterfailing-money-test-1545072.
79
Nicholas Godlove, Regulatory Overview of Virtual Currency, 10 OKLA. J. OF L. & TECH. 1,
26 (2014).
80
Supra note 2 at 629. (“This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is found in the difference
of transaction costs between an online threeparty exchange, and a two-party exchange.”)
81
7 U.S.C. § 1.a (9).
82
COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) NO 1287/2006 OF 10 AUGUST 2006 IMPLEMENTING
DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AS REGARDS
RECORDKEEPING OBLIGATIONS FOR INVESTMENT FIRMS, TRANSACTION REPORTING, MARKET
TRANSPARENCY, ADMISSION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO TRADING, AND DEFINED TERMS
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT DIRECTIVE, OJEU L 241/1, Art. 2(1).
83
Id, Recital 24 (“The definition of a commodity should not affect any other definition of that
term in national legislation and other community legislation.”)
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Bank has classified cryptocurrencies as commodity. The law on paper in the
EU is indecisive and the issue is likely to remain controversial.
The debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies rather than
being grounded on evidence and objectivity, tends to utilize radical subjectivity
making it difficult to engage in constructive and solution oriented dialogue. It
appears that the key reason for utilizing radical subjectivity is the need to define
cryptocurrencies as something other than money, to avoid stricter state
regulation or perhaps even a total ban, through polarization. Classifying
cryptocurrencies as commodities as opposed to money could aid in avoiding the
application of anti-money laundering law as evidenced by the decision of the
California Court where the judge dismissed money laundering charge on the
ground that bitcoin did not qualify as money84. In 2014, Pacy argued:
…regulators and scholars have been reticent to treat
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin as money, electing instead to
attempt to fit this new technology into an existing regulatory
framework as something other than money. By doing this, they
create unnecessary complexity and sometimes absurd results.85
The situation has remained almost the same in the year 2018. Despite
the fact that cryptocurrencies are exchangeable to and from traditional
currencies and they are used to pay for things, there is unwillingness to call
them money86.
2.2.1 THE RADICAL SUBJECTIVISM
The attempt to define cryptocurrencies as a commodity and the
methodology adopted reveals the utilization of radical subjectivism in certain
regards, which comes at the expense of intellectual debates losing credibility
and misrepresentation of facts.
Bitcoin has been compared to gold by its enthusiasts often in a
misleading manner aimed at hyping users and investors87. The comparison
focuses on the process of creation of bitcoin-mining a term which also describes
gold extraction process88 and the competitive price for the two things89. Often,
the cryptocurrency/gold comparison is based on the notion that gold is
expensive just because people subjectively view it as more valuable relative to
other metallic commodities that are perhaps as durable and functional as gold.
Hence, the argument goes that if the users view cryptocurrencies as valuable,
Florida vs. Michel A. Espinoza, F14-2923, (11th Cir. July 22, 2016).
Supra note 74 at 121.
86
Id.
87
Jocelyn Aspa, Is Bitcoin the New Gold?, INVESTING NEWS (Sep. 2017),
https://investingnews.com/daily/tech-investing/fintech-investing/bitcoin-the-new-gold/.
Accessed on 13 Jan. 18.
88
Id.
89
Id.
84
85
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there is no reason not to treat them as gold. Reflecting this sentiment, Prentis
argues:
The price of traditional commodities, like gold, silver, and
agricultural products, vary in accordance with their demand and
scarcity. When more people want a commodity that has a fixed
supply, the price rises. Similarly, the price of Bitcoin fluctuates
according to the same fixed supply model…. Bitcoins are
considered rare because there is a fixed supply of them, leading
users to be willing to pay increasing prices to control them. The
value of a bitcoin is ultimately driven by supply and demand—
a coin is worth whatever someone is willing to pay for it90.
Prentis asserts that it is appropriate to treat bitcoin as commodity91
asserting that bitcoin has inherent value in its ability to reduce transaction cost
by enabling less costly two-party transactions than traditional three-party
transactions92.
While it is undeniable that users/speculators are willing to pay for
bitcoin, bitcoin cash, ether or litecoin as much as they are willing to pay for
gold, it is farfetched to go as far as arguing that bitcoin has intrinsic value. In
examining whether bitcoin has inherent value, Godlove argues that “It has more
characteristics in common with commodities than with currency, except for the
most essential: It has no inherent value.”93 If intrinsic value is a value of a thing
judged independently of its monetary use or a value of a thing for its own sake94,
the question is, would cryptocurrencies remain useful if stripped of their ability
to transfer fund? It requires an impossible mental gymnastics to give positive
answer to this. One could make an exception for certain types of new generation
cryptocurrencies that are used as means of taking part in certain investment
ventures whose value is determined by their ability to enable users to have
access to investment ventures or platforms and services provided in the digital
economy (see infra § 3.2).
Bitcoin has also been compared with subterranean property95. In 2014,
the US District Court of Western District of Washington handled a case in
which it considered, inter alia, whether a contract to mine and deliver certain
number of bitcoins constitutes an executory contract96. Examining the case,

90

Supra note 2, at 628.
Id at 626.
92
Id at 629 (“This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is found in the difference of
transaction costs between an online three party exchange, and a two-party exchange.”)
93
Supra note 79 at 26.
94
Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/.
95
Casey Doherty, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy – Understanding the Newest Potential Commodity,
ABI J. 33, 28–33 (2014).
96
In re CLI Holdings, Case No. 13–19,746 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
91
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Doherty wrote an article in which he stated that ‘Bitcoin also shares similarities
to “subterranean” commodities through its extraction process, as demonstrated
by in re CLI Holdings.’97 Citing Doherty’s article, Borroni in addressing the
legal framework for bitcoin in the EU wrote “…the qualification of Bitcoins as
a commodity stems from the case in re CLI Holdings, whereby the court treated
Bitcoins like a “subterranean commodity” (for example oil), due to the
similarities arising from the “extraction process” shared by both of them”98.
Doherty’s article and by extension Borroni’s, make a factually incorrect
suggestion that the court drew a parallel between bitcoin and subterranean
properties.
In re CLI Holdings99 on or about August 14, 2013, Bitvestment entered
into a bitcoin services agreement with CoinLab, CLI Holdings Inc. and their
respective affiliates (Amended Agreement)100. As per the agreement,
Bitvestment paid the debtor, 75, 000 USD in return for which the debtor agreed
to mine and deliver 7,984.006735 BTC to Bitvestment101. The debtor breached
the contract failing to deliver the bitcoins mined after the amended agreement,
following which, Bitvestment filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the
Southern District of NY against the Debtor seeking, inter alia, specific
performance102.
On November 5, 2013, the District Court stayed the action against the
debtor because the debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy103 subsequently to which
it filed a motion to reject the contract104. The debtor’s motion for rejection of
the contract was based on U.S.C. § 365 which allows the judge to approve the
rejection of executory contract by the trustee105. The court dismissed the motion.
In its reasoning the court reaffirmed that the key feature of executory
contracts is that the “obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that the
failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material
breach and thus excuse the performance of the other.”106 It ruled that since
97

Supra note 95.
Andrea Borroni, A Fuzzy Set in the Legal Domain: Bitcoins According to US Legal Formants,
BITCOIN AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 104 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
99
Supra note 96.
100
In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO
(Feb. 7, 2014), Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, p. 2.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO
(15 November, 2013).
105
11 U.S.C. §365(a).
106
In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746KA(12 Dec. 2013) , Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Reject Executory Contract with
Bitvestment Partners LLC, p. 1. Since the court’s order cites the parties’ submissions, the
reasoning of the court is found in the Creditor (Bitvestments’s) objection to debtor’s motion to
reject executory contract. See In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy
Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO(29 Nov. 2013), Bitvestment Partners LLC’s objection to
debtor’s motion to reject executory contract, p. 4. The court relied on the definition of
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Bitvestment has performed its obligation (paying 75, 000 USD), the debtor is
the only party to the agreement with an ongoing obligation, namely to mine and
deliver to Bitvestment the Bitcoins for which reason the contract was not
executory107.
In this case, whether bitcoin is commodity was not relevant, despite this,
Doherty used it to compare bitcoin with subterranean property108. He stated that
“the court, in keeping with the analogous majority view of oil and gas precedent
(though not citing it), found that the debtor could not reject a contract where the
only performance of the interest-holder was to receive production.”109 The court
did not cite oil and gas precedents by Doherty’s own admission but he still used
the case to draw a parallel between bitcoin and subterranean properties. To read
oil and gas precedents into this decision is a complete misrepresentation of the
court’s decision and the parties’ arguments as well as a betrayal of objectivity
committed by Doherty in his attempt to fit the case to his narrative.
Subterranean commodities such as oil have physical existence and intrinsic
value whereas cryptocurrencies do not. This in and of itself makes the
comparison a mere academic exercise with no use for policy decisions. The
reality is that it sounds more convincing to push the agenda that
cryptocurrencies are commodity and not money by misusing judicial decisions.
The stories highlighted suggest that due to the radical subjectivism
utilized in the debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies, it is difficult
to engage in a rational and policy oriented discussion. Hence, it is more
judicious to single out the areas in which cryptocurrencies are relevant and
should be regulated and examine if the legal framework accommodates them or
could inspire tailor-made regulatory framework for them, instead of getting lost
in responding to industry driven talking points.
2.3 THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT
The latest development affecting the legal classification of
cryptocurrencies is the emergence of New Generation Cryptocurrencies
(NGCs), created through complex Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), where the
investors who invest money in a new cryptocurrency (token) are given various
rights, including the right to share dividends derived from the investment of the
company and the right to vote to determine the direction of the company110.
Illustrations of NGCs include GxCoin that gives token holders the right
to vote on investment proposals by the promoters according to the term of the

executory contracts provided by the Ninth Circuit in Marcus & Millichap Inc. v Munple, Ltd.
(In re Munple), 868 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1989), cited by Bitvestment in its objection to
the debtor’s motion for the rejection of the contract.
107
Id.
108
Supra note 95.
109
Id.
110
See supra note 3.
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smart contract111 or Astronaut Token sold to investors with the view to investing
the fund received from the investors in various listed cryptocurrencies and
ICOs,112 token holders being entitled to receive dividends quarterly, pro rata to
their coin holding113. More emblematically, Envion Company that offers ENV
tokens has two mining operation channels114. The first one is the so-called
proprietary mining operation where the company invests in, owns and operates
the mining, whose proceed is distributed to token holders as earnings115. The
second component is where Third-Party Operations (TPO) where an
independent company, acquires the mining operation from the company while
the company operates them and the third-party operator is rewarded with a share
and the 35% of the earnings of this business model is distributed to ENV token
holders116.
In the US, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has ruled that
tokens sold using these kinds of schemes qualify as investment contract117. In
its 13th of November 2017 investor warning, the European Securities Market
Authority (ESMA) identified risks pertaining to ICOs/NGCs118. It issued a
supplementary statement in which it stated that depending on how the ICO is
structured, the token may fall under the MiFiD II, the Alternative Investment
Fund Managers (AIFMs) directive and be subjected to the prospectus
directive119. But it did not give a detailed guideline on when precisely ICOs
may fall under the MiFiD II and the AIFMs directive.
It is established in the existing literature that the NGCs do qualify as
security and may fall under the European Securities Market Law120, for which
reason this article does not dedicate more space to the discussion. It suffices to
state that the NGCs have not even made it to exchange platforms, if at all any
of them could be traded on exchanges. Their chances of success and economic
significance are difficult to estimate at this point as most of them are just
launched or yet to be launched. Most importantly, some of the NGCs are based
111
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Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-18304 (Dec. 11, 2017).
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on the earlier cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and ether and are mostly
instruments of advancing the use of the earlier generation cryptocurrencies
while others are accepted as means of payment only on specific platforms to
allow the user to have access to services provided by those platforms and their
community of users and developers there by limiting their chance of being
accepted as universal methods of payment121.
To sum up, though the debate on legal classification of cryptocurrencies
is profound and informative of the points of contention, it is also too polarized
to guide policy decision and framing of legal rules and to a large degree
influenced by ideological inclination and industry affiliation. Therefore, from
the existing scholarship, readers can pick which side they are on. This article
takes a more pragmatic approach and aims to examine the potential regulation
of cryptocurrencies under payment services law; this can and should be done,
regardless of how decentralized cryptocurrencies are defined. Cryptocurrencies
are exchanged to and from traditional currencies122. They are being used to
transfer fund from one place to another. Exchanges that handle them also handle
traditional currencies123. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how payment
services law treats them or should treat them and what the placement of
cryptocurrencies under payment services law or designing a unique one for
them entails.

121

For instance, Crypto Investment Fund (CIF) ICO issues CIF Token that is offered to
businesses that accept cryptocurrencies in their payment system using CIF payment processor.
CIF Token gives these businesses access to utilities provided by CIF including education on the
use of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. See CRYPTO IMPROVEMENT FUND ICO, Business
Plan,
(Nov.
2017),
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3.
CRYPTOCURRENCIES UNDER EU PAYMENT SERVICES LAW
The regulation of cryptocurrencies under the payment services law
has been explored by scholars124. But most of the previous works ignore
the central problem- decentralization (see infra section 3.7). This part of
the article examines the legal framework governing payment services in
the EU with the view to showing how decentralization is a significant
impediment to constructing tailor-made legal framework for payment
services.
3.1 THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENT AREA REGULATION
Since 2012, the European Union has implemented a legal framework
governing Single Euro Area Payment (SEPA Regulation) that aims to provide
uniform electronic payment system across the European Union.125 The SEPA
Regulation “lays down rules for credit transfer and direct debit transactions
denominated in euro within the EU where both the payer’s payment service
provider and the payee’s payment service provider are located in the EU, or
where the sole payment service provider (PSP) involved in the payment
transaction is located in the Union”126. The SEPA Regulation sets common rules
for credit transfer and debit transactions including conditions of payment, fees
and governs the rights and duties of the payment service providers and users in
general127.
Since payments made in cryptocurrencies do not qualify as credit transfer or
debit transactions, the SEPA regulation does not govern them. However,
cryptocurrency exchanges should and do comply with SEPA Regulation when
users deposit Euros in their digital wallet to purchase cryptocurrencies or to
withdraw their cryptocurrencies in Euros.128 But SEPA Regulation does not
regulate payments effected exclusively in cryptocurrencies as the payments
must be denominated in Euro as a general rule.129 Therefore, under SEPA
Regulation, the key problem with cryptocurrencies is the inability of
124

Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, its Legal Classification, and its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. OF BUS.
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(Palgrave McMillan, 2016).
125
REGULATION (EU) NO 260/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL OF 14 MARCH 2012 ESTABLISHING TECHNICAL AND BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS
FOR CREDIT TRANSFERS AND DIRECT DEBITS IN EURO AND AMENDING REGULATION
(EC) NO 924/2009, OJEU, L 94/22.
126
Id Art. 1(1).
127
See Id Arts. 3-8.
128
Payment Methods for European Customer, COINBASE (Jan 24, 2018),
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1767231-payment-methods-foreuropean-customers.)
129
Supra note 125 Art. 16(2) & (8).

20

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018
Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law:
Lessons from European Union Law
_______________________________________________________________
cryptocurrencies to qualify as currency of the EU member states covered by the
regulation, for which reason they are not covered by it.
3.2 THE ELECTRONIC MONEY DIRECTIVE
When examining cryptocurrencies and payments services, the
Electronic Money Directive of 2009130 appears relevant due to the digital nature
of electronic money which makes it closely resemble cryptocurrencies. But as
Vardi points out, the electronic money directive does not apply to
cryptocurrencies because (a) electronic money is issued in exchange for the
transfer of corresponding traditional currency at par value and (b) it must be
redeemable into traditional a currency at par value upon request of the electronic
money holder131.
Strictly speaking, cryptocurrencies are not issued in exchange for real
currency. Of course, as a factual matter, a user who wishes to acquire
cryptocurrency needs to purchase it from an exchange with real currency or
other cryptocurrencies. But this is not equivalent to an issuer receiving an
equivalent in a real currency. The seller of the cryptocurrency is not necessarily
the issuer. Second, whoever sells a cryptocurrency in general does not have the
duty to redeem it for real currency. So clearly, cryptocurrencies do not qualify
as electronic money.
3.3 THE PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE
The latest EU directive governing payment services, the Payment
Services in the Internal Market Directive (PSD II)132 has no specific provision
dedicated to cryptocurrencies. The PSD II applies to payment services133
including services enabling cash to be placed on a payment account and all the
operations required for operating a payment account134; services enabling cash
withdrawals135; execution of payment transactions, including transfers of funds
on a payment account with the user’s payment service provider or with another
payment service provider136; execution of payment transactions where the funds
are covered by a credit line for a payment service user137; issuing of payment
130
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instruments and/or acquiring of payment transaction138; money remittance139;
payment Initiation Service140; and account Information.141
The underlying feature of the concept of payment service under the
directive is transfer or administration of fund/money and activities aimed at
facilitating it142. The directive applies to payments services provided in the
currency of EU members states and under certain conditions in a currency of a
Non-EU state143. To that effect the directive states that “payments shall be made
in the currency agreed between the parties.”144 Because cryptocurrencies are not
currencies (legal tender of EU member states or third countries), the payment
services directive does not apply to them.
3.4 THE LESSON FROM SKATTEVERKET V DAVID HEDQVIST
Skatteverket v David is the first case involving bitcoin decided by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ)145. It involved the interpretation of the
Directive on Common system of VAT146. David Hedqvist a Swedish National
sought a preliminary decision from the Swedish “Revenue Law Commission on
whether transactions to exchange traditional currency for the bitcoin or viceversa, which he wished to perform through a company, were subject to VAT.”147
The Revenue Law Commission opined that Hedqvist’s activities were not
subject to VAT because they are exempt under the Common VAT Directive
which requires members to exempt transactions “including negotiation
concerning currency, bank notes and coins used as legal tender”.148
The Swedish Tax Authority appealed the case to the Swedish
Administrative Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Swedish
Revenue Law Commission149. Being uncertain whether bitcoin exchange is
exempt under the relevant provision of the directive, the Swedish
Administrative Supreme Court made a preliminary reference to the ECJ150.
The ECJ concluded that (a) exchange of bitcoin to or from other
currencies is supply of service for consideration151. However, (b) it is exempt
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under article 135(1) (e) of the Common VAT directive152. The court in particular
argued that bitcoin is not a tangible property153 rather it is a means of payment
accepted by the parties though it is not a legal tender154. In its reasoning the
court stated “… the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency has no other purpose than to be a
means of payment”155.
The ECJ showed a pragmatism in resolving the dispute without
classifying bitcoin as anything that is statutorily recognized, by labelling it as
“a means of payment”. It is to be noted that under the PSD II, “payment
instrument”, not “means of payment” is defined as ‘‘a personalised device(s)
and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and the
payment service provider and used in order to initiate a payment order.”156 The
relevant provision of the VAT directive essentially exempts negotiations
involving legal tenders from VAT157. It can be argued that the fact that the ECJ
put currencies and bitcoin together by treating them under this provision
indicates that at least for the purpose of the VAT directive, the court thinks that
bitcoin is equivalent to currency but this is only a speculation considering that
the court, it seems, intentionally avoided calling it money.
3.5 PAYMENT SERVICES LAW FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES
The European Central Bank indicated in its 2015 report on
cryptocurrencies that “In the EU, virtual currency is not currently regulated and
cannot be regarded as being subject to the (current) PSD or the EMD. As the
phenomenon is still relatively new and also moving into different areas, it would
be too early to try making new, tailor-made legislation”158. Three years later,
there is no effort in designing tailor-made payment service law for
cryptocurrencies. More importantly, the suggestion that it is possible to
designing sui generis payment services law for cryptocurrencies has never been
critically examined. The task faces enormous challenges tied to the fact that it
is difficult to define payment service provider using decentralized
cryptocurrencies in cases where cryptocurrency users have direct access to the
blockchain with no third party that has meaningful control over transfer of
funds. The blockchain does not qualify as a payment service provider or
financial institution as it is neither centrally managed by a single institution
(save in cases of centralized cryptocurrencies), nor in a position to get an
152
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authorization to serve as payment service provider. Most payments in
cryptocurrency are effected directly between the payer and the payee.
Hughes and Middlebrook extensively examine possible different
models for the regulation of cryptocurrency intermediaries in the US159. Their
work starts by clearly stating that” on the blockchain transaction”, i.e., direct
transfer of fund from a sender to receiver which is recorded on the public ledger
and can be verified by other users -does not go through an intermediary160.
Hence, they examine the possible regulatory models only for “off the
blockchain” transactions, where “intermediaries act as custodians of
cryptocurrency or cryptocurrency credentials originally belonging to their
clients and may facilitate and clear transactions for clients without updating the
public ledger.”161 They examine various provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Art. 4 and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act as implemented by regulation
E with the view of constructing how these statutes can serve as the basis for
designing specific regulation for cryptocurrency intermediaries162.
There is no comprehensive legal research assessing the challenges of
constructing payment services law for cryptocurrencies. The approach to
addressing this issue which gives regulators, lawyers and consumers a clear and
practical information on the issue is the one that points out the key challenge
that should be tackled and how it could be tackled if at all possible. This article
identifies technical deficiency as the single greatest challenge to building
payment system based on decentralized cryptocurrencies.
3.5.1

TECHNICAL DEFICIENCY

The most significant challenge to creating a payment system based on
cryptocurrencies is the technical deficiency of decentralized cryptocurrencies.
If this challenge is not tackled, a regulatory framework is guaranteed to be
ineffective. Various regulatory rules that apply to payment service providers
regulated by the EU payment services law could equally apply to payment
service provisions using cryptocurrencies. For instance, general prudential
requirements aimed at ensuring the soundness of financial institutions that
requires, among others, that payment service providers maintain certain amount
of capital can be imposed on financial institutions handling cryptocurrencies163.
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Under the payment services directive, payment service providers are expected
to maintain initial capital and own fund that must not fall below a certain
amount164. Any kind of regulatory rule aimed at ensuring the financial
soundness of payment service providers could be applied to payment service
providers using cryptocurrencies. But the technical deficiency that lies at the
foundation of cryptocurrencies and blockchain is difficult to resolve.
Technical deficiency refers to the defect in the technological
infrastructure of decentralized cryptocurrencies that makes it difficult to define
payment services providers that are capable of satisfying the requirements
necessary to obtain license/authorization to engage in payment services
activities. The lack of the necessary technical infrastructure of decentralized
cryptocurrencies contradicts some of the core principles controlling
authorization of payment service providers. Tackling decentralization goes to
the core of regulating cryptocurrencies as payment system. Other issues such as
issues of security, consumer protection, and bankruptcy are secondary and
resolvable. Discussing these issues without first fixing the technical deficiency,
in particular decentralization is futile.
To use an analogy - to tame a black mamba, one of the deadliest snakes
in the world, upon capturing it a prudent person must defang it before taking
any other measure. To capture the snake and put it in a cage with its fang intact
is likely to end in the snake killing either the capturer who intends to tame it or
other people. The capturer could say that the cage is secure enough, or he/she
puts on gloves, boots and long sleeve clothes in handling the snake. But none
of these cautionary measures can assure that the snake does not bite and kill
someone. The most efficient and effective measure to avoid being killed by the
black mamba during taming is to take out its fangs. Discussing other cautionary
measures is imprudent and most likely useless. Decentralized cryptocurrencies
are like a black mamba, and decentralization is like the fang of the black
mamba. Attempting to regulate decentralized cryptocurrencies without first
tackling its decentralization is like attempting to tame the black mamba without
removing its fang.
A. LACK OF THE NECESSARY
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
TRANSPARENT RULES OF RESPONSIBILITY
Under the PSD II, in order to obtain an authorization, a payment service
institution must have prudent management, robust governance arrangement,
clear organizational structure and well-defined, transparent and consistent lines
of responsibility165. The PSD II states in particular that:
The competent authorities shall grant an authorisation only if,
taking into account the need to ensure the sound and prudent
164
165
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management of a payment institution, the payment institution
has robust governance arrangements for its payment services
business, which include a clear organisational structure with
well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility,
effective procedures to identify, manage, monitor and report the
risks to which it is or might be exposed,…166
Decentralized cryptocurrencies are inimical to the requirements of
prudent management, robust governance arrangement, clear organizational
structure and well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility
because transfer of fund can be made directly from the sender (payer) to the
receiver (payee), to be confirmed by miners on the blockchain, with no central
processing authority167. There is neither an organizational structure of
management, nor lines of responsibility that requires miners to engage in
mining or imposes an obligation on them to confirm transactions.
Even in cases where custodian digital wallet providers are involved in
facilitating payment, though they could meet the requirements of prudent and
responsible management and hence could obtain authorization, they cannot
solve the problem arising from “on-the blockchain” transactions where users do
not go through custodian wallet providers. In other words, unless “on-the
blockchain” transactions are prohibited by making it mandatory for users to go
through digital wallet providers or exchanges to conduct transactions in
cryptocurrencies, it is impossible to design a regulatory framework akin to the
payment services directive for cryptocurrencies. Assuming further that users do
use intermediaries to conduct their transactions, the intermediaries themselves
depend on the blockchain for final settlement since any cryptocurrency
transaction must be registered on the blockchain.
To take a practical example, what happens if “A” transfers 1 Bitcoin to
“B” in payment and offers a fee, the equivalent of 10 dollars in bitcoin and the
transaction remains unexecuted for two days as a result of which the underlining
contract is cancelled by the counter-party or “A” could not book his/her hotel,
because the miners simply did not confirm the transaction on the ground that
the transaction fee was too low? In payment services provided by traditional
currencies, the PSD II makes the payment service provider liable for any
charges and interest resulting from the non-execution or defective, including
late execution of the payment transaction168. For “on the blockchain”
transactions, no similar rule could be designed just because there is no central
office that is in charge of executing payments. Since the miner could be anyone
in the world, in case of his/her failure to confirm a transaction, there is no way
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for a supervisory authority to design a complaint mechanism or a redress and
penalty systems169.
If a legal rule which requires that all transactions in cryptocurrencies go
through intermediaries is to be setup, the same enforcement problem persists.
How could the miners distinguish between transactions coming from
intermediaries on the one hand and those coming from other entities and
individual users on the other hand? After all, every cryptocurrency user has only
a public key on the blockchain170 without name or any other personal
identification information. Therefore, technically, it is not possible to
implement such as rule with respect to decentralized cryptocurrencies.
B. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COUNTERING TERRORISM FINANCING LAW
ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
All financial institutions are obliged to operate in compliance with the
existing rules governing combating money laundering and countering terrorism
financing enshrined in the EU Anti-Money Laundering and Countering
Terrorism Financing Directive (“the AML/CTF Directive (2015)”)171. This
directive was formally implemented in the member states of the EU by the 26
of June 2017172. Since this directive did not cover cryptocurrencies, the
European Commission has proposed an amendment - “the Proposed AML/CTF
Directive173.
The proposed AML/CTF directive recognizes that under the applicable
law, obligations imposed on traditional financial institutions including the duty
to identify suspicious activities aimed at combating money laundering and
terrorism financing using the Union's financial system do not apply to
cryptocurrency exchange services providers and custodian wallet providers174.
It also recognizes that the anonymity provided by cryptocurrencies, enabling
criminal behaviours would be more hindrance than an asset for cryptocurrencies
and sets to tackle anonymity175. Accordingly, the proposed amendment is set to
extend the application of AML/CTF Law to cryptocurrencies and
intermediaries dealing with them176, defines the new institutions such as
169
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custodian wallet providers177, and requires member states to prohibit financial
institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks, or
anonymous safe deposit boxes178.
Pursuant to its purpose, the proposed directive has a set of measures
aimed at combating money laundering and terrorism financing using
cryptocurrencies. Two of the oddest notions under the proposed directive are
the potential setting up and maintaining of a central database for registering
cryptocurrency users' identities accessible to Financial Intelligence Units of
member states and self-declaration forms for users179. These ideas are odd as
they deviate from measures imposed by AML/CTF laws applicable to
traditional financial institutions. To require user database in traditional financial
service would be requiring a central registry for users of the USD, the Euro or
Yuen. While this measure may be aimed to identifying cryptocurrency users
who have direct access to the blockchain because they do not use custodial
digital wallets or exchanges, it is nearly impossible to enforce it. If users simply
fail to register or self-declare, law enforcement has to put all individuals who
have computer on which the blockchin node can be downloaded as suspects for
violating the rule.
By proposing legal rules that are patently ineffective, the European
Commission and the relevant institutions that took part in drafting the proposed
AML/CTF as related to cryptocurrencies are dodging the question of regulating
miners and the blockchain. When the blockahin is the central point of
decentralized cryptocurrencies and the miners are like bankers who handle
transactions, it is either naïve or intentionally dodgy trying to regulate only
users and intermediaries whose role in the ecosystem of cryptocurrencies is only
secondary.
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4.
THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES AS PAYMENT SYSTEM
This article has shown that the existing EU legislation governing
payment services do not apply to cryptocurrencies. Moreover, there is an
impediment to constructing tailor-made payment services law for
cryptocurrencies ingrained in the technical design of decentralized
cryptocurrencies. But what does the future hold for cryptocurrencies as payment
system? There are two alternative solutions both of which are not reassuring to
anyone who wants to see cryptocurrencies-succeed centralization or state
cryptocurrency.
4.1 CENTRALIZATION
By now it must be an open secret that decentralization is considered to
be the strongest attribute of cryptocurrencies. But from regulatory point of view,
it is the feature that works against cryptocurrencies as it would eventually hurt
the chance of designing reasonable regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies.
Speaking of the virtue of decentralization, Antonopoulos states:
Early digital currencies used a central clearinghouse to settle all
transactions at regular intervals, just like a traditional banking
system. Unfortunately, in most cases these nascent digital
currencies were targeted by worried governments and eventually
litigated out of existence. Some failed in spectacular crashes
when the parent company liquidated abruptly. To be robust
against intervention by antagonists, whether legitimate
governments or criminal elements, a decentralized digital
currency was needed to avoid a single point of attack. Bitcoin is
such a system, completely decentralized by design, and free of
any central authority or point of control that can be attacked or
corrupted180.
Antonopoulos thinks that the complete decentralization of bitcoin
ensures robustness and is government intervention-proof181. The assertion may
be correct. But the absurdity in praising complete decentralization as a saviour
of cryptocurrencies from legitimate governments speaks volumes about how
irresponsible some of the cryptocurrency backers can be. Why should
legitimate governments not be able to reasonably regulate cryptocurrencies?
But setting that question aside, complete decentralisation is actually the single
greatest adversary of cryptocurrencies with the potential to end them or render
them just experimental projects, with no meaningful use for the broader
economy. In order to create a robust payment system, it is absolutely imperative
to have a central entity that obtains authorization to engage in providing
180
181
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payment services, is able to take responsibility for facilitating payments and is
held accountable and liable for any obligations arising from its activities. There
is simply no system that is sustainable with no central authority that is held
accountable to the community of users. But centralization is undesirable for at
least two reasons. It creates a private monopoly and it does not entirely resolve
the accountability deficit that is deeply rooted in the decentralized
cryptocurrencies.
A. PRIVATE MONOPOLY
Centralizing cryptocurrencies has the potential to create a monopoly.
One of the political motives for creating bitcoin is the aversion to a central bank
monopoly over the creation and regulation of money as acknowledged by the
European Central Bank stating that “the following ideas are generally shared
by Bitcoin and its supporters: they see bitcoin as a good starting point to end
the monopoly central banks have in the issuance of money”182. The intention
behind cryptocurrencies is to challenge the existing financial system which
presupposes the monopoly of central banks in money creation and mainstream
financial institutions in the provision of financial services. If centralized
cryptocurrency is to be advocated for, it would mark the official reversal of this
objective of cryptocurrencies.
Centralization of cryptocurrencies and blockchain could take various
forms. The simplest form is where a company or a group of companies highly
regulated by the state create(s) cryptocurrencies. Centralization could also be
achieved by leaving cryptocurrencies as decentralized as they are today but
requiring that all transactions be conducted through intermediaries with no
direct access by the user to the blockchain. But the latter route is costly in terms
of enforcing the rules that impose the use of intermediaries. But both options
would essentially create a conducive atmosphere for the monopoly in the
delivery of payment services, the very idea decentralized cryptocurrencies were
designed to tackle.
B. GENERAL LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
As cryptocurrencies stand today, lack of accountability of developers
and miners for any conduct that may undermine monetary policy or payment
system is of an immense concern. The European Central Bank echoed the
sentiment that cryptocurrencies are not threat to monetary policy arguing that
they are irrelevant to the real economy183 and that the upper limit placed on
bitcoin creation by its protocol ensures that it has no inflationary effect184. It
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reached similar conclusion regarding the potential adverse effect of
cryptocurrencies on the stability of EU payment system185.
Today, the notion that the upper protocol based limit to the creation of
bitcoin is a determining factor in the effect of cryptocurrencies on monetary
policy or payment system should not be taken seriously. Bitcoin protocol is run
by individuals who have no mandate given to them by any group of people. If
there is an agreement amongst them, there is no reason the protocol cannot be
changed. There is already an evidence that the protocol is not faithfully adhered
to. Due to the sustained disagreement among the developers and miners, as of
August 1, 2017, a split or what is referred to in technical term as “a hard fork”
has occurred, leading to two different chains in the bitcoin blockchain186. With
the hard fork, two separate systems have been created, i.e., one that requires
upgrading the software to Segwitx2 increasing the block size from 1 megabyte
to 2 and stores some of the bitcoins off the blockchain, and the other which
merely increases the block size to 8 megabytes187. The latter option led to the
creation of a new cryptocurrency – the Bitcoin Cash (BCC)188, which is
operating parallel to bitcoin. Protocol based limit to bitcoin is a hoax. If it is
not, bitcoin advocates must answer why bitcoin and bitcoin cash, both traded
on cryptocurrency exchanges, that emanated from the bitcoin blockchain are
operating side-by-side but as independent cryptocurrencies.
Another important factor that must be taken into account in determining
the supply of cryptocurrencies and their disruptive effect on the financial system
in general and payment system in particular is that the cryptocurrency systems
are run by self-interest maximizing individuals who are motivated by money.
They are not motivated by the desire to build a better payment system for the
society. It is for this reason that ideas such as bitcoin’s potential to help banking
the unbanked189, propagated by the bitcoin advocates happened to be only a
hoax when the cryptocurrency community turned around and started advancing
that cryptocurrencies are just assets with skyrocketing prices. On December 6,
2017, on Bitstamp, a Luxembourg based cryptocurrency exchange, 1 bitcoin
was worth over 12, 000 USD, 1 Litcoin was worth over 99 USD, and 1 Ether
was worth over 433 USD190. These prices surely fluctuate, regardless of which,
it is reasonable to ask which one of these cryptocurrencies is accessible to the
unbanked.
The campaign for cryptocurrencies is based hyperbole and a degree of
deceptive advertising, in the light of which it is not rational to believe that the
project genuinely provides a better alternative to the existing state monopoly
over money creation and regulation. Neither would cryptocurrencies, left to
185

Supra note 158 at 27.
Bitcoin Cash: 5 Fast Facts you need to Know, HEAVY, http://heavy.com/news/2017/08/howdoes-bitcoin-cash-work/.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Nyshka Chandran, Can bitcoin help the world's unbanked?, CNBC (July 5, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/05/can-bitcoin-help-the-worlds-unbanked.html.
190
See BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/
186

31

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018
Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law:
Lessons from European Union Law
_______________________________________________________________
private entities, offer stable and reliable system of payment. Centralisation of
cryptocurrencies would not solve the issues of accountability unless the level
of centralization goes to the extent of creating cryptocurrencies that are bound
by national rules and operate at a national level.
4.2 STATE CRYPTOCURRENCY
State cryptocurrency is the most extreme policy direction that could be
taken with respect to cryptocurrencies. At the very outset, it ought to be clear
that state/national cryptocurrency potentially addresses not only the issues of
payment system but also monetary policy at large, provided that the use of
cryptocurrencies as medium of exchange for goods and services become
mainstream. At this point in time, there is no precise data on the volume of
transactions conducted in cryptocurrencies and it is not useful to try to look for
data or to speculate. But should cryptocurrencies become a mainstream system
of payment, a revision of monetary policy would be inevitable191. This, among
others, requires issuing state cryptocurrencies because there is simply no
evidence suggesting that cryptocurrencies as private currencies would function.
Neither are there rules to that effect.
In emphasizing on the importance of rule based monetary system,
Friedman argued that rule based monetary system “will have the effect of
enabling the public to exercise control over monetary policy through its political
authorities, while at the same time it will prevent monetary policy from being
subject to the day-by-day whim of political authorities.’192 Freidman’s proposal
for rule based monetary policy is a result of his objection to the prevailing
monetary policy that is based on wide discretion exercised by independent
authorities(central banks), which he considers is contrary to ensuring stable
monetary system193. If state-run monetary policies should be subject to tight rule
based controls, there no reason similar standards should not be applied with
regard to cryptocurrencies.
But assuming that the time to discuss the monetary impact of
cryptocurrencies and the regulatory response for that is not yet due, state
cryptocurrency would significantly tackle the difficulty in taming
cryptocurrencies even merely as payment systems.
A. EXPLORING
THE
PROPOSITION

STATE

CRYPTOCURRENCY

The concept of state cryptocurrency was alluded to in 2016 by the
current chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Powell who made the suggestion
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that central banks could issue their own cryptocurrencies by using distributed
digital ledger technology194. The Central Bank of China has launched a
prototype of its cryptocurrency195. But no specific date is set for the launching
of the Chinese state cryptocurrency. In theory, the solution maintains the
benefits of distributed digital ledger and the speed and convenience (if any)
associated with cryptocurrencies. But two general questions must be answered
with respect to the idea of state cryptocurrency. The first one is whether the
system solves problems inherent in cryptocurrencies as we know them today.
The second one is, even if a state cryptocurrency naturally mitigates the risks
associated with decentralized cryptocurrencies, whether it is feasible.
B. THE FEASIBILITY OF STATE CRYPTOCURRENCY
A proposal for state cryptocurrency is not advocated for in mainstream
scholarship. Michael states that “peer-to-peer central bank is the most obvious
public institution that might be built on a cryptocurrency, because a
cryptocurrency essentially performs the function of a central bank.”196 He
spends the rest of his argument addressing how a software based creation of
money could be used to control money growth and inflation dedicating little
discussion to how the Peer-to-Peer central bank works.
According to a paper published online by Deloitte, state-sponsored
cryptocurrency differs from decentralized cryptocurrencies, inter alia, in the
lack of cap on money supply contained on the ledger, in the reduced stigma and
fear of adoption, official sanction and use of national currency and in the
regulation of Ledger miners and the low probability of fluctuation in exchange
rate197. In theory, state cryptocurrency should incorporate the essential features
of cryptocurrencies with the necessary modification to ensure that the system
runs smoothly by balancing decentralisation and a level of centralization
necessary to govern the blockchain not only by rules of algorithm but also by
legal rules that apply to the conduct of miners and other intermediaries that
partake in maintaining the ecosystem. Its most important feature must be that it
replicates cryptocurrencies to the maximum extent possible.
First, a state cryptocurrency should be created by the national central
bank with due regard to its incumbent monetary policy priorities, including
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inflation control. Second, the state cryptocurrency should maintain a level of
decentralization by allowing banks and financial institution to incorporate it in
their payment system. The users of state cryptocurrencies would have digital
wallets provided by licensed financial institutions. Since the state
cryptocurrency does not necessarily replace cash money, rather it supplements
it; it could be preferred by certain users. If the real intent of cryptocurrencies
was indeed to enable conducting transactions faster and cheaper, state
cryptocurrency would be the closet replica, without the downside of regulatory
difficulty and cost involved in attempting to regulate decentralized
cryptocurrencies. But I don’t advocate for inflexibly fixed supply for state
cryptocurrencies as the decision to increase or reduce money supply has to be
revised according to the need for money supply in the society. Hence, the
central bank in charge of the specific cryptocurrencies (for instance the
European Central Bank and European National Central Banks) should
determine the supply of the cryptocurrency. Software protocol imposed limit is
arbitrary and unrealistic. For instance, it is almost impossible to purchase small
amount of bitcoin because it is too expensive and one ends up paying excessive
transactions fee to purchase a small amount.
Overall, implementing state cryptocurrency is possible but the challenge
it faces should not be ignored. First and foremost, a state cryptocurrency might
discourage users from using cryptocurrencies. Today, it is clear that the fast
growth of cryptocurrencies is attributed to the fact that they are private and they
operate in relatively under-regulated or unregulated spaces.
If the state takes cryptocurrencies over, it is not certain whether they
would remain equally attractive. At the same time, whether a state
cryptocurrency is implemented or not, regulations are going to be put in place
sooner or later. Hence, if a state cryptocurrency can discourage users, so does
tighter regulation. So it seems that any sort of regulation of cryptocurrencies is
likely to curtail their attractiveness. Originally the value of cryptocurrencies
derived from their potential to serve as cheap method of payment. But as times
passes, this raison d’etre has been abandoned as the transaction cost for the
major cryptocurrencies is not that low and transfer of fund is not that fast. When
this is coupled by regulations that are almost non-existent now in the EU, using
cryptocurrencies would be even more expensive. So, was the cryptocurrency as
money and payment system merely an attractive broken campaign promise? It
appears so.
A system of payment or currency whose main strength is lack of
regulation cannot be considered sustainable at all. I strongly argue that both
tighter regulation and state cryptocurrency have similar effect of discouraging
the use of cryptocurrencies as both would simply target decentralization and
anonymity, two of the most attractive features of cryptocurrencies. The best
course of action would have been to simply define cryptocurrencies as securities
as the new generation cryptocurrencies are used to evidence a stake in an
enterprise. But the problem is that some are used as medium of exchange and
there even emerging project campaigning to make cryptocurrencies mainstream
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payments methods198. If this is indeed not done, a greater portion of the
cryptocurrencies would simply not have values.
CONCLUSION
It is almost a decade since bitcoin was first launched. Today there are
dozens of decentralized peer-to-peer currencies. Despite the regulatory
problems cryptocurrencies present, no meaningful step has been taken in the
European Union. A closer examination of cryptocurrencies demonstrates that
typical cryptocurrencies do not fit into the traditional legal rules governing
payments services. Due to the technical deficiency of decentralized
cryptocurrencies, reflected in unfettered decentralisation as their main feature,
designing tailor-made payment service law for cryptocurrencies is impossible.
This article proposed two possible solutions to the problem. The first
one is centralization of cryptocurrencies run by private entities coupled with a
mandatory obligation to use intermediaries to transact in cryptocurrencies. This
solution could potentially create private monopoly over payments systems
conducted in cryptocurrencies. It also sustains the accountability deficit deeply
embodied in decentralized cryptocurrencies. The second solution is creating
state cryptocurrencies, run by the central bank. This solution is likely to
discourage the use of cryptocurrencies, as it seems that cryptocurrencies have
gained popularity because they are run by private entities, in a decentralized
manner and anonymously. But considering that tighter regulatory frameworks
will inevitably be put in place with the effect of discouraging the use of
cryptocurrencie for the prevalence of strong rule of law in the digital economy,
the creation of state cryptocurrencies is the only realistic solution moving
forward.
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